What the population of a nearby town thinks about the battle, however, and, more importantly, what they will do that could affect ones objectives, fall more into the social realm. Listed below are the main points from those ideas. No doubt there are many good reasons to study the local culture but it will teach you nothing about how to counter your average Taliban fighter. The IA WFF is composed of all actions, systems and capabilities that contribute to the narrative produced by the force. [xxxix] Some will argue vehemently that SOF values education, but in my experience the resources spent on education are a far cry from what is spent on equipping. The job, during this lull, seems to be related more to "building friends and influencing people" and building "trust" and building the capacity of local military, police and intelligence forces. Secondly, by attacking civilian targets, the terrorists strategy was to influence those within the power base? It is essential to retaining and exploiting the initiative. The danger to SOF does not lie simply with the publication of the handbook: this is simply a symptom of a larger problem. Only now, at least in the west, the population holds the political power and they become the targets. That's a good one. [v] White, Curtis, The Middle Mind: Why Americans Dont Think For Themselves, HarperOne, 2004, 7. If youd like to learn more about this subject, check out the book you see below on Amazon. By its nature, the M2 WFF exists in the physical domains and inherently in close proximity to the threat and civilian elements. Although this is a simplification and perhaps disingenuous, one way of thinking about the two types of domains is to imagine an armored division battle as being one largely within the land domain. After all, there are many examples in our own history where military commanders considered the population [or human domain as we call it now?] I also always wondered how much OPSINTEL was being compromised on a daily basis by these activities. Technical rationality (TR) is closely linked to positivist philosophy and is the antithesis of critical realism: TR assumes the social world can be treated the same as the physical world in terms of philosophical approaches and using the scientific method can gain knowledge about it that can be exploited in action in the future. This positivist[xviii] philosophy would be bad if we simply believed it consciously. It accomplishes this through the collective and coordinated use of kinetic and non-kinetic joint fires and effects in support of a manoeuvre plan, employing these means to delay, disrupt, or destroy enemy forces (adapted from RNZA Duties in Action). Please leave your comments and input in the comment section below. Is human domain the same concept that we used when we sent human terrain teams into both Iraq and AFG on six digit salaries---what did they miss or fail to accomplish. The HTS was a massively costly program for both the US Army and the taxpayer ---was a total waste of money---ie the Awakening was generated by AQI forking the Sunni insurgency not by anything Gen. P or Nagel did or what HTS provided in many badly written reports. More expansive than Military Intelligence, the Int WFF recognises that various sources of information may impact on command decision making. UW by the way can be boring as well as extremely hectic and then boring---whereas DA is so "in"----the thing of movies--whereas training and living with your troops on a daily basis and trying to move the ball forward just three centimeters is something that is of no interest to movie makers. As part of capacity building, engagement with Host Nation Security Forces (HNSF) may form part of the CIMIC aspect of the IA WFF area of responsibility. This being, whether they know it yet or not, our young folks' generational project, which has just begun. If our adversaries had that capability our TTPs in Afghanistan would have to rapidly and drastically change. The system is duplicatable and is used from the smallest of units up to large battalions and brigades. The intelligence warfighting function tasks facilitate the commanders visualization and understanding of the threat and other relevant aspects of the operational environment. [xxxviii] This implies activities wholly encompassed by the concept of the human domain. The Sustainment WFF is composed of all systems, elements and capabilities relating to the provision, movement, sustenance and well-being of personnel, materiel and installations. To illustrate how the MIE multiplier might augment the guerrillas effectiveness lets take a senior Haqqani Network (HN) commander who has designs on attacking a position in or near Khost, Paktia AF. The commander and staff leverage the intelligence enterprise, coach and train the intelligence core competencies, implement the operations and intelligence processes, and direct the intelligence effort through the intelligence capabilities.
As I responded to Madhu, I do think the "science vs art" construct is over simplistic, but I think what makes the human domain- if one wishes to use that term- "hard" is how humans construct meaning- thus the importance of what some call "social" facts. There was a series of great comments on the question of UW recently in Dave Maxwell's SWJ article. If, as is posited by many military leaders and commentators, the human domain is a different domain than the Army has focused on in the past (the other domains being more physical: land, sea, air and cyber), then it would seem to follow that the tools and philosophy we use might not be the most effective when acting in another, arguably very different, domain. I think you have made many valid points and more importantly direct personal observations based on your experiences. Example ---who would have assumed two years ago that the fighting in Syria would in fact become the ME's center of a religious civil war where the issue of the Shia revival is coming to a point--- drawing militant Shia and Sunni's in from as far away as AFG (yes even AFG Shia are drifting into Syria now). This is juxtaposed with an operation like Desert Storm in which the objectives were clear and limited in both scope and time, even if they were limited somewhat artificially and ignoring the obvious connection to Operation Iraqi Freedom. And. I think as well that the difference between the 60s and now is the length of rotations---we had a year to gain experience---AND the replacement process was individual replacements not team replacements--this allowed a sizeable amount of institutional knowledge to remain inside the team all the time---now whole teams come and go thus the institutional knowledge disappears if not passed on extremely well during RIP/TOA. mation as a joint function is but the first step toward enhancing joint warfighting and developing a future joint force able to dominate in the conflicts of tomorrow. No COP, firebase, airfield, etc. The alternative, and the militarys current preferred philosophy, is the technically rational approach. [xxix] Then-Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Commanding General, General Martin E. Dempsey, according to one anonymous School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) instructor, told the SAMS authors of the draft design publication that it was too long, had too many big words, and didnt have any of our current doctrinal concepts like Center of Gravity in it. Whether this is true or not, shortly thereafter Dr. Jack Kem wrote a short design booklet (Design: Tools of the Trade) that linked design to doctrine and as soon as LTG William B. Caldwell IV left Fort Leavenworth for Afghanistan and took Dr. Kem with him, the original draft authors quickly published The Art of Design, Student Text 2.0, which attempted to undo the changes that TRADOC reportedly had ordered. movement of forces for the purpose of gaining an advantage over the enemy in order to accomplish our objectives. Intelligence is the process of understanding the enemy using all information on the enemy, civilians nearby, and the terrain and weather conditions. And understand that the enemy (government or population, as the case may be), will not, as was thought, be waiting with roses. E. Pre-Columbian cultures did not use plants for decoration. [xx] The U.S. military and SOF used to do this naturally prior to the Cold War by drastically drawing down the Army and doing away with SOF altogether after a war. And, therefore, the point of our spear came to point in their direction. They are a tactical tool that often makes us feel good in achieving temporary gains or waiving the flag. Thru the same lens they would have recognized what events indicate discipline and control and what events reflect anxiety, panic, fear and hysteria. Unfortunately, most people in the military are unaware of their own philosophy- or, at the least, the institutional philosophy that their doctrine, planning constructs, and systems and processes are founded upon. Like Bill M stated if the enemy acquired ATGMs, beam riding weapons and secure Comms we would be looking a much more lethal conflict ecosystem - to put it mildly. b. They all belong. The enemy forces you speak spend very much time watching every move our forces made and make in Iraq and Afghanistan-outside the wire. Did those deploying understand "swarming" as practiced historically and used in Iraq and AFG? Decisions need to be made and executed quickly. The insurgents currently have the M1E which they use as effectively as they can to trip us up, now imagine the M1E further enabled with digitized surveillance and smart weapons. A critical distinction as it speaks to the heart of our general tendency to confuse technical proficiency with aptitude in problem solving, especially in complex environments. [xxiii] UW is defined by US SOF as support to resistance (insurgent) forces to overthrow or disrupt a government or governing entity. And SOF seems to be making its 21st Century reputation on conventional warfare on steroid rather than on unconventional type work. Sydney J. Freeburg took the following thought from a Strategic Landpower Conference in August of this year: Strategically, that failure to understand the human factor is the root of the abject failure that the Army, Marines, and SOCOM are determined not to repeat.[xiii] This follows on the heels of the Armys Field Manual 3-24 Counterinsurgency Manual and subsequent debates between the COINdinistas, such as John Nagl who have pushed for a human-centricity in contemporary war efforts, and those who would advocate that the narrative being sold on Iraq is flat-out wrong. [xvi] See Donald A. Schon, The Reflective Practitioner: How professionals think in action. It synchronises intelligence analysis with the tactical tasks of intelligence operations, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) to drive the development of intelligence on threats, the operational environment and civilian situation. Sustainment provides the support necessary to maintain operations until mission accomplishment. how much does a company pay for h1b visa. Know and define one's friends and allies. The purpose of the Protection WFF is to preserve combat power, the ability of the force to operate in the threat environment. I also agree with your thoughts on how we misunderstand our enemy. I believe that SOF, or at least the Green Berets, should remain in the unconventional world and not get bogged down with the limitations the Conventional Army places on creative thinking. Its certainly a sticky issue and Im not sure what the right mix of security and positive public affairs efforts are. The. Since the purpose of military action is to affect the behavior of human groups in the operational environment toward a defined objective, the Army must improve the doctrinal representation of the operational environment and account for the socio-economic, cognitive, and physical aspects of human activity. The more conservative/anti-western reform folks -- who represent and defend the non-western way of life and way of governance of a state and society -- these folks are likely to be your natural enemies. Outlaw09, In order for SOF to best contribute to operations within the human domain I assert that we have to do two things: 1) ensure our doctrine and concepts support a more nuanced and dynamic approach to operations at the conceptual level and, 2) mimic at the operational and strategic levels the same kinds of things that make us special at the tactical level. SOF and those involved in the human domain are a force seeking to sense-make the world largely in an explicit way, but the world we want to operate in is instead socially constructed and filled with tacit knowledge. This reliance on systems and process instead of relationships and coup d'il[xix] genius does have some advantages, but it also must undergo fundamental reform every now and then as well as perhaps the brutal test of peer-to-peer combat to avoid the natural tendency to over-bureaucratize. I add to the conversation only to throw out my thoughts on the advantages and disadvantages of the human domain concept. MS 301: Training Management and the Warfighting Functions Revision Date: 31 March 2022 Lesson 20,23,26,29,32: Branch Orientation Briefings Student Handout 1 Information Briefing Sheet Cadets will prepare and present an information briefing concerning an assigned branch. We Westerners suffer from the belief that everyone is just like us. I would argue that we had all the understanding concerning the human factor by 2006 in literally hundreds of intelligence reports and interrogation reports---the abject failure was not on the SF side as the JSOC targeting against FF and AQI gave the CF a chance to focus their attention on the actual Sunni/Shia insurgent groups---the abject failure was the simple fact that up to even 2010 no deploying BCT fully "understood" what they were "seeing" as no one took the time inside CF to process the sheer amount of data available into a coherent training program. This is an interesting discussion. This is the future that the ACoS means when he mentions human domain---what he does not mention ---it can only be handled via UW/SW. What saved the remaining Groups after the massive 70/80s RIF was DA and strat recon-it was the difference between SF and the CF and something only SF could do--what the new SF forgot was that DA and SR were done even when SF had a deep/deeper understanding of UW---DA and SR were conducted by the various 5th SFGA Projects including Delta and the MACV-SOG programs at the same time that the 5th was driving the CIDG program and running the various Corp and National Mike Forces. We saw in the last days the killing of a really major Hezbollah Commander by an AQ affiliate who is rumored to be supported by the Saudi's. Knowingly or not, we in the military are governed largely by a system of systems that theoretically ties the Presidents security strategy to everything the military does, from the way the Army organizes into brigades to the type of rifle infantrymen carry. Unfortunately, one of the strongest capabilities of a bureaucracy is the capability of fooling those within the bureaucracy that everything is great.[xxi]. One could argue that General Lee based his operations in the North during the Civil War as a way to influence the Northern population to put pressure on President Lincoln and the US government to end the war; did he not? The purpose of the M2 WFF is to position land forces in relative advantage to the threat. I think to a certain extent things are still not too bad at the team level. This is distinct from a highly skilled practitioner of a set of skills (I.e. SF majors who are not selected to be S-3 operations officers for a Group (brigade-level organization) are rarely considered competitive for tactical command, however SF Groups do not fight as Groups, normally SF fights as teams. He was surrounded by a gaggle of equally wide-eyed individuals of similar disposition that suggested to me ALQ had trawled the homeless shelters and shanty towns throughout the third world and southern Europe to get fighters. ~ Wikipedia, This Army Warfighting Function is the process of ensuring Army forces have everything they need to complete their missions. Out of these, the cookies that are categorized as necessary are stored on your browser as they are essential for the working of basic functionalities of the website. These cookies do not store any personal information. Trusting a subordinate to plan and execute a mission objective enhances efficiency and places the U.S. at an advantage against its near-peer rivals. Also let me suggest that our enemies may have a better understanding of our political objective -- and, thus, the war that we and they are embarked upon -- than do many of our leaders and soldiers. It prioritizes education and training over platforms and technology as well as persistent engagement over drone strikes, direct action raids, and Hollywood movies. Instead it would encourage critical and creative thinking, demand a multi-framed approach at the most fundamental of levels, and require learning-in-action or reflective practice. [xli] If SOF is to be successful at the operational and higher tactical levels, absent a personnel system that allows for flexibility and mission focus, we must incorporate at the very least a rigorous testing and experimentation program to assist us in finding the right tools and philosophical approach for operating in the human domain. But destroying the physical tools of war does not eliminate the reasons people fight. WFF are the physical means that tactical commanders use to execute operations and accomplish missions assigned by a superior commander. Human aspects of conflict and war, taken together, encompass the totality of the physical, cultural, social, and psychological environments that influence human behavior. [xxii] Doctrine applied to the world of tacit knowledge makes little sense and I would argue makes things more confusing. "Understanding" and "seeing" that particular world is what we have not done well as a Force. These tasks are; The purpose of the Int WFF is to know what is happening. These arent mechanized divisions we are attempting to outflank or terrorists we are killing in the human domain, these are very contextual-dependent groups of people whose values we are attempting to appreciate and either influence or employ to some effect. Power base of tacit knowledge makes little sense and i would argue makes things more confusing and elements. Not done well as a force there was a series of great comments on the question of UW recently Dave... 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